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“Imagination is what makes our sensory experience meaningful, enabling us to interpret and make
sense of it, whether from a conventional perspective or from a fresh, original, individual one. It is
what makes perception more than the mere physical stimulation of sense organs. It also produces
mental imagery, visual and otherwise, which is what makes it possible for us to think outside the
confines of our present perceptual reality, to consider memories of the past and possibilities for
the future, and to weigh alternatives against one another. Thus, imagination makes possible all our
thinking about what is, what has been, and, perhaps most important, what might be.”—Nigel J. T.
Thomas (2004, as cited in Manu, 2006, p. 47)1.
Investigations of the information processing mechanisms that underlie imaginative thought
typically focus on a single branch of imagination, such as prospection, mental imagery or creativ-
ity, and are often generalized as being insightful to understanding the workings of imagination
in general. In reality, however, there is very little in the way of theoretical or empirical exchange
between the scientific communities that conduct research within the different domains of imagi-
nation. As a result, the research impetus in each of the sub-domains may be skewed to the pursuit
of hypotheses that are not particularly viable in terms of understanding imagination as a whole.
An example of this is pegging the roots of imagination to the processes of episodic memory—a
reasonable assumption to make based on studies of episodic prospection. However, the associated
findings and theoretical conclusions that follow are not entirely consistent with the literature on
the mechanisms underlying creativity (Bubic´ and Abraham, 2014), which is another core realm of
imagination.
In an effort to promote interchange across the frontiers of imagination, in this Opinion Arti-
cle we put forward the idea that all aspects of imagination emerge from semantic memory with
increasingly higher-order levels of imaginative information processing emanating from and inter-
acting with existing systems, eventually expanding beyond these to form new systems (Figure 1).
We compare the associated neurocognitive findings and assumptions in terms of their fit with
current knowledge in other fields of imagination and discuss their implications for reformulating
hypotheses regarding imagination as a whole.
The What?
Our conceptual knowledge of the world is the foundation from which all imaginative thought
emerges and, as such, constitutes “the what-system” within the information processing hub.
Investigations of the manner in which concepts are acquired, represented, stored, and accessed fall
within the field of semantic cognition. The brain networks that underlie the what-system include
1http://archive.today/www.imagery-imagination.com or http://www.co-bw.com/BrainConciousness%20Update%20index.
htm
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FIGURE 1 | An informal illustration of how imaginative processes emerge from and expand beyond semantic memory operations.
modality-specific sensory and motor systems as well as multi-
modal or supramodal regions within the inferior parietal lobe,
middle and inferior temporal gyri, fusiform and parahippocam-
pal gyri, inferior frontal gyrus, dorsomedial and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate gyrus (Binder et al.,
2009; Binder and Desai, 2011; Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2012).
Such insights have emerged from neuroscientific investigations
into the brain basis of semantic memory, semantic aspects of lan-
guage processing, and the organization of conceptual knowledge
in the brain.
The What–Where?
Determining the location of any object or person relative to one-
self, some other person or object is only possible by accessing
representations of spatial information such as direction, orienta-
tion, distance and position of that object or person. Such infor-
mation is coded by means of reference frames relative to the
observer (egocentric) and independent of the observer (allocen-
tric) (Burgess, 2006). Tasks of spatial memory and navigation
have shown that medial temporal lobe structures such as the
hippocampal formation, parahippocampal gyrus, entorhinal and
perirhinal cortices as well as medial parietal regions, such as
the retrosplenial and posterior cingulate cortices (Burgess, 2008;
Chrastil, 2013; Ekstrom et al., 2014), are critically involved in
spatial information processing. Others tasks of spatial cognition,
such as perspective taking, have indicated the involvement of
additional regions within the posterior parietal cortex, particu-
larly the inferior parietal and temporo-parietal areas (Byrne and
Becker, 2007; Dhindsa et al., 2014).
The What–Where–When?
An event is defined as a specific happening (what) that occurs
at a certain place (where) and at a given time (when). During
retrospection we access events from our personal past (episodic
memory, autobiographical memory), whereas during prospec-
tion we contemplate events that could unfold in our personal
future (episodic future thinking). Both fall within the umbrella
concept of mental time travel (Tulving, 1985). Neuroscientific
evidence has consistently revealed that the brain network that
is engaged when we imagine personal events in the near or
distant future overlaps considerably with the network that is
activated when we ponder our episodic or autobiographical
past (Schacter et al., 2007, 2012; Mullally and Maguire, 2013).
Regions that comprise this brain network include the ventral
and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, retrosplenial and posterior
cingulate regions within the medial parietal cortex, anterior lat-
eral temporal cortex, inferior parietal cortex, and medial tem-
poral lobe structures such as the hippocampus. Notably, the
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regions of the mental time travel brain network also closely cor-
respond to those of the brain’s default mode network (DMN).
The DMN is active under conditions of rest and low task
load, and is held to reflect processing demands associated with
mind-wandering, internal mentation and stimulus-independent
thought (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). DMN brain areas are also
involved in other facets of higher order cognition, like mental
state reasoning or theory of mind, moral cognition, and self-
referential thought (Buckner et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009), all
of which involve reasoning about one’s self and/or others.
The What-If?
Our capacity to imagine possibilities is virtually unconstrained.
Investigations on the information processing circuits involved
in prospection address the question of “what if?” or “what
might be?” within a specific temporal context of our personal
lives (which covers the aforementioned episodic prospection
of the what–when–where system). However, our cognitive
capacity to explore hypothetical possibility spaces is neither
limited only to our personal lives nor to any temporal fac-
tor (past/present/future). Other operations that fall under the
category of what-if or hypothetical reasoning based cognitive
processes include semantic prospection, semantic or episodic
counterfactual reasoning and creativity. In addition to the par-
tial conceptual overlap between the what-if system and the pre-
viously discussed what-where-when system, the two also share
common underlying neural mechanisms. Although only a few
neuroscientific studies have investigated semantic prospection
or the propensity to think about the non-personal future, the
limited evidence indicates that semantic prospection is reliant
on similar parts of the brain’s episodic mental time travel net-
work, particularly with reference to the engagement of anterior
and dorsal medial prefrontal regions, inferior parietal cortices,
the hippocampus and related medial temporal lobe structures
(Abraham et al., 2008; Race et al., 2013).
In contrast to semantic prospection, which is relatively unre-
stricted with regard to the types of imaginable alternatives, coun-
terfactual thinking primarily involves exploring possibilities that
are contrary to what has already come to pass. Research on
brain correlates of counterfactual comparisons and emotions
that often accompany such cognition, such as regret, indicates
a key role for the orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal
cortices (Camille et al., 2004; Levens et al., 2014). Furthermore,
studies that have assessed episodic past, episodic future and
episodic counterfactual thinking have reported a common brain
network, involving the hippocampal formation, temporal lobe
structures, lateral parietal regions as well as medial and lateral
prefrontal areas. Within the episodic cognition domain, counter-
factual thinking recruits some of these areas more strongly than
past and future thinking, and also additionally engages the bilat-
eral inferior parietal lobe and posteriormedial frontal cortex (Van
Hoeck et al., 2013).
Semantic prospection and counterfactual reasoning are con-
cerned with hypothetical reasoning linked to the future and the
past, respectfully. However, one can also engage in hypotheti-
cal reasoning within temporally unspecific contexts such as those
involving moral and mental state reasoning, which, as pointed
out earlier, strongly overlap in terms of their implicated brain
network with the what–when–where system (Buckner et al.,
2008). While the contexts tapped in such hypothetical reason-
ing operations are decidedly social in nature, a non-socially based
avenue within which we necessarily exercise our capacity to think
hypothetically is that of creativity.
Our capacity to be creative is examined by assessing the
extent to which we are able to generate original and relevant
responses to a particular end (Stein, 1953; Runco and Jaeger,
2012). The underlying brain mechanisms of creative cognition
are very complex (Abraham, 2014). Brain regions such as the
dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, retrosplenial and
posterior cingulate cortices as well as medial temporal lobe
structures are strongly engaged during divergent thinking, or
the generation of multiple responses in an open-ended situa-
tion (Abraham et al., 2012). This indicates that there is a con-
siderable overlap in the neural correlates of divergent thinking
and that of the what–when–where network. While divergent
thinking certainly involves hypothetical reasoning and explo-
ration of an abstract possibility space, it does not necessarily
translate to creative thought. Having constraints on divergent
thinking pushes the information processing system to be nec-
essarily creative (both original and relevant) and this leads
to the additional activation of the semantic cognition and
cognitive control networks with the major contributions being
provided by brain regions such as the inferior frontal gyrus,
temporal pole, frontopolar cortex, and basal ganglia. So the
neural correlates of creative cognition system overlap only par-
tially with those associated with other aspects of the imagina-
tion system with common activations seen in the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobe (the what–when–
where system) as well as the inferior frontal gyrus (the what-
system).
Integrating the Disparate Systems of
Imagination
In this Opinion Article, we explored the view that processes
of imagination—the “where” of spatial cognition, the “what-
when-where” of episodic retrospection and prospection, and the
“what-if ” of semantic prospection, counterfactual reasoning and
creative thinking—emerge from a foundation provided by the
“what” of semantic memory operations. The evidence thus far
clearly indicates that the many processes of imagination, which
have mostly been systematically investigated in isolation from
one another, are neurally implemented in substantially overlap-
ping brain networks and are also similar with respect to their
underlying cognitive algorithms and mechanisms. This resonates
with other proposals that have highlighted that semantic and
episodic cognitive operations and their related brain systems are
dynamically interlinked (Squire and Zola, 1998; Greenberg and
Verfaellie, 2010), as well as with recent calls for de-emphasizing
the episodic or autonoetic aspects of future oriented cognition
and advocating the central role played by semantic memory in
the same (Stocker, 2012; Irish and Piguet, 2013).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 325
Abraham and Bubic Semantic memory as the root of imagination
This does not mean that all imaginative processes are to be
considered “atemporal” per definition. Many forms of mental
time travel as well as counterfactual thinking patently involve the
consideration of temporal factors as a core facet of the imag-
inative process. In taking this a step further, it may even be
argued that such processes are necessarily linked to the brain’s
predictive systems due to the fact that they involve the gener-
ation of estimates concerning events that reliably unfold over
a certain period of time, albeit with differing levels of cer-
tainty (Bubic et al., 2010). This position has rarely been consid-
ered in the literature on imagination-relevant operations but it
would fit with a number of suggestions that posit prediction as
the fundamental mechanism that modulates our general neural
and cognitive processing (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Pezzulo,
2008).
So, although the issue of temporality is undoubtedly relevant,
the more fundamental basis that underlies all of the aforemen-
tioned processes is the reliance on our experiences with the world,
its objects and events. We therefore suggest that if the aim is to
develop a comprehensive information processing model of imag-
ination, the foundational elements should be discussed in terms
of semantic memory operations. As semantic memory involves
the abstraction of content from experiences that are specific to
sensory, motor, or affective modalities, conceptualizing the pro-
cesses of imagination as stemming from semantic operations
allows for a more seamless integration of its theoretical mod-
els with that of the wider research realm of perception, action
and cognition where concepts such as embodied cognition and
predictive processing are revolutionizing our understanding of
psychology.
We hope these ideas will stimulate future research and the
development of novel paradigms as well as critical scientific
exchange between the research communities involved in under-
standing different aspects of imagination. Some questions can
be already anticipated such as the “chicken-and-egg” problem
within which it appears impossible to clearly substantiate what
came first, or concerns about how to reach a consensus about
what can be considered an underlying foundational element.
Through the process of this discussion though, we hope that
building blocks and essential frameworks will be uncovered
that will guide us through the incredibly rich world of human
imagination.
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